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JUSTICE THOMAS AND PARTIAL INCORPORATION OF
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: HEREIN OF
STRUCTURAL LIMITATIONS, LIBERTY INTERESTS,
AND TAKING INCORPORATION SERIOUSLY
Richard F. Duncan*
INTRODUCTION
Here is something the average guy in America cannot understand.
Why is it constitutionally permissible for a public school to decorate the
halls with posters celebrating "gay pride" month even over the
reasonable objections of persons (including persons of faith) offended by
that government-sponsored ideology, but unconstitutional for a public
school to celebrate Christmas by putting up a cr~che if even one person
is offended? Is this confounding result really required by the
Constitution of the United States? If so, is it required by the written
Constitution as originally understood, or is it part of the living,
breathing, intelligently-designed Constitution1 crafted by the Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States?
Although one possible answer is to point out that the Establishment
Clause imposes a structural limitation on government disabling
government from endorsing or sponsoring religion, that merely
substitutes one question for another. How does a structural limitation on
"Congress" extend to define the structural powers of state and local
government? In other words, under the doctrine of incorporation, how is
a structural limitation on the power of Congress an individual "liberty"
incorporated against the states by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment?2 If we take the prevailing theory of
* Sherman S. Welpton, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of
Law. Special thanks to my research assistant, Jesse Weins, for excellent help on this
project. Jesse, by the way, will soon begin a career as a public interest attorney litigating
religious liberty with the Alliance Defense Fund.
1 Proponents of the living, breathing, "evolving" Constitution have never explained
how the Constitution "evolves" into a new species and in so brief a time. Surely, the sudden
appearance of new constitutional rules in the fossil record is best explained by a theory of
intelligent design, or Creation if you please, by shifting Supreme Court majorities. For
example, Erwin Chemerinsky observes that nonoriginalists believe that "the meaning and
application of constitutional provisions should evolve by interpretation." ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 18 (3d ed. 2006) (emphasis
added). "Evolving by interpretation" sure sounds like an account of Creation to me,
especially in light of Chemerinsky's acknowledgment that new constitutional rights, such
as a right to abortion, can come into being by judicial decisions. Id.
2 See Joseph M. Snee, S. J., Religious Disestablishment and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 371-73. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress
Duncan in Regent University Law Review (2007) 20. Copyright 2007, Regent University. Used by permission.
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incorporation seriously, why should we think that the structural
component of the Establishment Clause may "legitimately be read into
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?" 3
Perhaps the best lens through which to view this puzzle is to
imagine three separate lawsuits challenging daily recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance in government schools:
Case One
In the first case, A sues School District X and claims that the
requirement that all students recite the Pledge violates his right not to
speak under the Free Speech Clause.
Case Two
In the second case, B sues School District Y and claims that the
requirement that all students recite the Pledge violates the Free
Exercise Clause, because B's religious beliefs forbid her from pledging
allegiance to any nation or human institution.
Case Three
In the final case, C sues School District Z and claims that recitation
of the Pledge in government schools is unconstitutional under the
Establishment Clause because of the phrase "one Nation under God."4
What is surprising about these cases is the way they come out
under black letter First Amendment doctrine. Under West Virginia State
Board of Education v. Barnette, A will win his lawsuit because the school
may not compel any student "to confess by word or act" his allegiance to
any "matter[] of opinion."5 However, A's right not to participate in
recitation of the Pledge does not include a right to silence his teacher
and willing classmates who wish to participate. As Judge Easterbrook
explained in Sherman v. Community Consolidated School District 21, "so
long as the school does not compel pupils to espouse the content of the
Pledge as their own belief, it may carry on with patriotic exercises.
Objection by the few does not reduce to silence the many who want to
pledge allegiance .... ,"6 Similarly, if B's Free Exercise claim succeeds-
and under Employment Division v. Smith7 it may not succeed-the
result will be merely to grant B an opt-out from her forced participation
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .. "
3 Snee, supra note 2, at 372.
4 See 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
5 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
6 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992). For an excellent discussion of Judge
Easterbrook's opinion in this case, see Abner S. Greene, The Pledge of Allegiance Problem,
64 FORDHAM L. REV. 451 (1995).
7 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (stating that, as a general rule, the Free Exercise Clause
does not protect religious exercise against restrictions imposed by neutral laws of general
applicability).
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in the activity, not to enjoin teachers and willing students from carrying
on with the Pledge exercise.8 Remarkably, however, if C succeeds in
convincing a court that the words "under God" in the Pledge violate the
Establishment Clause, the result will be that C's right to demand strict
separation between church and state includes the right to "silence the
many who want to pledge allegiance" to one Nation under God.9 In other
words, C's "liberty" under the Establishment Clause includes the power
to silence others, to control which lessons government schools may teach
and willing pupils may learn. This is an amazing liberty, if liberty it be!
Judge Easterbrook's answer-that the First Amendment treats
religious and secular activities differently and that "[sleparation of
church from state does not imply separation of state from state"10 -is
responsive only if the structural requirement of separation between
church and "Congress" is somehow understood as an individual liberty
incorporated against the states by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The purpose of this Article is to focus on the
issue of "liberty" under the Establishment Clause and incorporation of
that "liberty" under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this regard, the
Article focuses particularly on the Establishment Clause jurisprudence
of Justice Clarence Thomas and upon his insightful suggestion that "in
the context of the Establishment Clause, it may well be that state action
should be evaluated on different terms than similar action by the
Federal Government. ' n
I. THE FOGGY ROAD TO INCORPORATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The Bill of Rights was originally ratified as a check on the power of
the federal government, and in Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, the
Supreme Court held that these amendments were not applicable to the
8 See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that a general
scholarship program excluding funding for students majoring in devotional theology was
constitutional because the state had strong interests in not funding religious indoctrination
and because "the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden" on the
excluded students); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 537-39 (1st
Cir. 1995) (holding that a compulsory educational assembly requiring fifteen-year-old
students to view sexually explicit and sexually suggestive materials and skits did not
amount to a constitutionally recognizable burden on the students' or the students' parents'
free exercise of religion).
9 Sherman, 980 F.2d at 445; see, e.g., Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 328 F.3d 466, 487 (9th
Cir. 2003) (enjoining recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in a public school district
because the phrase "under God" impermissibly endorsed religious principles, inculcated
religious views, and coerced religious action), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Elk Grove
Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 17-18 (2004) (reversing on the issue of the
noncustodial parent's prudential standing to sue in federal court).
10 Sherman, 980 F.2d at 444.
11 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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states.12 Chief Justice Marshall explained this holding in no uncertain
terms:
Had the framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations
on the powers of the state governments, they would have imitated the
framers of the original constitution, and have expressed that
intention. Had congress engaged in the extraordinary occupation of
improving the constitutions of the several states by affording the
people additional protection from the exercise of power by their own
governments in matters which concerned themselves alone, they
would have declared this purpose in plain and intelligible language.
. . . These amendments demanded security against the
apprehended encroachments of the general government-not against
those of the local governments.
• . . These amendments contain no expression indicating an
intention to apply them to the state governments. This court cannot so
apply them. 13
However, by early in the twentieth century the Supreme Court
found a way to "incorporate" certain provisions of the Bill of Rights
against the states as "part of the liberty protected from state
interference by the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."'14 Under this concept of "selective incorporation," a
particular provision of the Bill of Rights "is made applicable to the states
if the Justices are of the opinion that it was meant to protect a
'fundamental' aspect of liberty."'15 In other words, only individual
liberties that are deemed to be 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty"' 16 or 'fundamental to the American scheme of [j]ustice"' are
incorporated against the states by the liberty clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 17 As Justice John Paul Stevens has put it so eloquently,
"the idea of liberty" is the source of the incorporation doctrine.' 8
Moreover, under the doctrine of incorporation these fundamental
individual liberties are protected only against "deprivations" by the
states. 19 Individuals do not have a right to strike down laws that merely
offend their sensibilities, because only laws that deprive them of
protected liberty-i.e., laws which impose substantial burdens, undue
12 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833).
13 Id.
14 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 1, at 499.
15 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 15.6, at 799 (4th ed. 2007).
16 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
17 Id. at 800 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana., 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)).
18 John Paul Stevens, The Bill of Rights: A Century of Progress, in THE BILL OF
RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 13, 33 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992).
19 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the portal for
incorporation, provides: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 1 (emphasis added).
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burdens, or extreme restrictions on their individual liberty-constitute
unconstitutional deprivations of liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Thus, the incorporated liberty of free exercise of religion is
protected (if at all) only against laws that impose "substantial burdens"
on an individual's religious exercise. 20 Similarly, freedom of speech
protects an individual's right to say what he wishes to say and to refrain
from being compelled to speak, not the right to censor the state's
message or to silence willing messengers of the government's speech.21
The right to just compensation for regulatory takings is protected only
against "extreme"22 regulations that deprive an owner of "economically
viable use" of her property. 23 Even a woman's "fundamental liberty" to
choose to terminate an unwanted pregnancy is protected only against
laws that unduly burden her liberty to choose, not against laws that
reasonably regulate her access to abortion or which merely seek to
persuade her to give life to the child she is carrying.24
Thus, under the Court's theory of incorporation, structural
provisions of the Constitution-i.e., those which define and limit the
20 See Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 725 (2004) (holding that a government
scholarship that could be used by college students to pursue a degree in any course of study
except devotional theology imposed only a "relatively minor burden" on the free exercise
liberty of scholarship recipients and thus did not violate the incorporated Free Exercise
Clause); see generally Ira C. Lupu, Where Rights Begin: The Problem of Burdens on the Free
Exercise of Religion, 102 HARV. L. REV. 933 (1989).
21 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 630, 642 (1943). As
Judge Easterbrook observed in Sherman, although a student has a right under the
incorporated Free Speech Clause to not be compelled to recite the Pledge of Allegiance in a
government school, she does not have a corresponding right to censor the curriculum or to
silence her classmates "who want to pledge allegiance." Sherman v. Cmty. Consol. Sch.
Dist. 21, 980 F.2d 437, 445 (7th Cir. 1992).
22 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 329 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "only the most extreme
regulations can constitute takings").
23 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 499 (1987)
(holding that a regulation requiring 27 million tons of coal to be left in the ground to
protect surface structures from subsidence is not a taking because petitioners did not prove
"that they have been denied the economically viable use" of their overall coal mining
operations).
24 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) (stating that
"an undue burden is an unconstitutional burden"). In Casey, the Court specifically declared
that a state could regulate abortion so long as the regulation did not impose an undue
burden on the woman's liberty:
To promote the State's profound interest in potential life, throughout
pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman's choice is
informed, and measures designed to advance this interest will not be
invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the
right.
Id. at 878.
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powers of the national government--"resist incorporation,"25 because
these provisions do not create fundamental individual liberty interests.
For example, no one would suggest that the powers of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce and to declare war 26 should be
incorporated and made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth
Amendment.27 Further, a provision which contains both a structural
component and a liberty component is properly subject only to partial
incorporation, in the sense that only the liberty component is capable of
incorporation as a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" protected by the Due
Process Clause.
Surely, one would think that the Supreme Court must have
struggled mightily with this problem when deciding whether to
incorporate the Establishment Clause, because, as Akhil Amar has
observed, "The original [E]stablishment [Cilause, on a close reading, is
not antiestablishment but pro-states' rights."2 In other words, the
Establishment Clause is a structural provision that "is agnostic on the
substantive issue of establishment versus nonestablishment and simply
calls for the issue to be decided locally."29 How could a structural clause
designed to promote federalism and "states rights" be incorporated as a
fundamental individual liberty under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment? How did the Court explain this paradox when
it ruled that the Establishment Clause was applicable to the states? As
Horace Rumpole, John Mortimer's fictional "Old Bailey hack," might say:
"[A]nswer came there none."30 Indeed, the first Supreme Court decision
to incorporate the First Amendment, Gitlow v. New York, merely
"assumed" that "freedom of speech and of the press-which are protected
25 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46 (2004) (Thomas,
J., concurring) ("I would acknowledge that the Establishment Clause is a federalism
provision, which, for this reason, resists incorporation.").
26 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 11.
27 See Luke Meier, Constitutional Structure, Individual Rights, and the Pledge of
Allegiance, 5 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 162, 163-67 (2006). Professor Meier is a colleague of
mine; I suggested this topic to him, and we shared many of our thoughts during numerous
long discussions.
28 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 34
(1998); see also STEVEN D. SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 18 (1995) (noting that the Religion
Clause is "simply an assignment of jurisdiction over matters of religion to the states-no
more, no less"). For an excellent and recent reappraisal of the "jurisdictional"
understanding of the Establishment Clause, see Steven D. Smith, The Jurisdictional
Establishment Clause: A Reappraisal, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1843 (2006).
29 AMAR, supra note 28. Amar continues: "[H]ow can such a local option clause be
mechanically incorporated against localities, requiring them to pass no laws (either way)
on the issue of--'respecting'-establishment? Id.
30 JOHN MORTIMER, Rumpole and the Right to Silence, in RUMPOLE A LA CARTE 80,
91, 119 (1990).
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by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress-are among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." 3 1
Gitlow's incorporation-by-assumption of the Free Speech Clause
was followed by conclusory dictum in Cantwell v. Connecticut, a case
concerning free speech and free exercise claims, incorporating not only
the Free Exercise Clause but also the Establishment Clause:
The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of
the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws. The
constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion has a
double aspect. On the one hand, it forestalls compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship.
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organization or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot
be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise
of the chosen form of religion. Thus the Amendment embraces two
concepts,-freedom to believe and freedom to act. 32
Justice Roberts's dictum in Cantwell led directly to Justice Black's
unreasoned assertion, in Everson v. Board of Education, concerning the
meaning of the Establishment Clause as applied to the states:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can
set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all
religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor
influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities
or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of
Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect "a wall of separation between church and State."33
31 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); see generally DANIEL L. DREISBACH, REAL THREAT AND
MERE SHADOW: RELIGIOUs LIBERTY AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 93-96 (1987).
32 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Professor Snee was very critical of Cantwell's
"unfortunate bit of dictum" concerning incorporation of the Establishment Clause, because
it "has since led the Court down a path strewn with further dicta on the establishment of
religion supposedly interdicted to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment." Snee, supra
note 2, at 371.
33 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164
(1878)). Justice Black made no attempt in Everson to explain or justify incorporation of the
Establishment Clause. He merely asserted that the First Amendment was "made
REGENT UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Sadly, such is the way that seismic changes in our government and
our liberties are all-too-often made in the Supreme Court-by naked
power and with neither rhyme nor reason. 34 As Professor Snee observed,
"[t]he inclusion of the [E]stablishment [C]lause into the liberty of the
Fourteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court has no firm basis in the
history of the clause or in logic"35 and has never been persuasively
justified. At a minimum, the Court was grossly irresponsible in Everson
for failing to justify its transformative decision to incorporate the
Establishment Clause, a decision that has spawned serious, lasting, and
divisive consequences that continue to haunt us to this present day. 36
II. JUSTICE THOMAS AND INCORPORATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Justice Clarence Thomas is the Supreme Court's most consistent
proponent of the jurisprudence of original intent,3 7 and his views on
incorporation of the Establishment Clause are the product of serious
historical scholarship concerning the "original meaning of the Clause."38
His views are also very nuanced and sophisticated. Indeed, he really has
two separate, but closely-related positions, positions that I am labeling
"no incorporation" and "partial incorporation."
For example, in Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,
Justice Thomas observed that the best scholarship on the original
understanding of the Establishment Clause supports the conclusion that
it is "best understood as a federalism provision-[which] protects state
establishments from federal interference but does not protect any
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth" and cited as authority a post-Cantwell decision,
Murdock v. Pennsylvania. Id. at 8 (citing Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)).
Murdock did not implicate the Establishment Clause; it was decided as a freedom of the
press and free exercise case. Murdock, 319 U.S. at 117. Professor Carl H. Esbeck criticizes
the Court for incorporating the Establishment Clause "without debate or even seeming
appreciation of what it was doing." Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as a
Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1, 25 (1998).
34 Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-22 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (referring to
the Court's creation of "a new constitutional right for pregnant mothers" to abort their
unborn children as being fashioned "with scarcely any reason or authority" and as "an
exercise of raw judicial power"). Professor Esbeck calls the Court's decision to incorporate
the Establishment Clause, without even considering its original design as a structural
provision designed to promote federalism, "an act of sheer judicial will." Esbeck, supra note
33, at 26.
35 Snee, supra note 2, at 407.
36 William Lietzau is very critical of "the Court's error regarding incorporation" of
the Establishment Clause, which, he states, "proves to be much more than a mere
misreading of history; it is an assault on the very heart of the [Flirst [A]mendment's
religious liberty protections." William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause:
Federalism and the Rollback of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1193 (1990).
37 See generally SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE
OF CLARENCE THOMAS 193-94 (1999).
38 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 693 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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individual right."3 9 Thus, incorporation of the Establishment Clause
against the states is incoherent, because it "prohibit[s] precisely what
the Establishment Clause was intended to protect-state establishments
of religion."40 In other words, incorporation of the Establishment Clause
has perverted the purpose of the Clause, because as Justice Stewart once
said: "a constitutional provision ... designed to leave the States free to
go their own way ... [has] become a restriction upon their autonomy."41
It is unlikely that Justice Thomas will ever convince a Supreme
Court majority to reject more than sixty years of precedent by deciding
to "unincorporate" the Establishment Clause. However, his second
position on incorporation-what I call "partial incorporation"-merely
asks the Court to take its own theory of incorporation seriously by
recognizing that "[w]hen rights are incorporated against the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment they should advance, not constrain,
individual liberty."42 In other words, the Establishment Clause may
mean one thing when applied as a structural limitation on the power of
the federal government, and something else when applied only to protect
individual liberty against state action. 43
For example, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris a neutral voucher
program that provided tuition aid to economically disadvantaged
Cleveland schoolchildren to attend a private religious or nonreligious
school chosen by their parents was attacked as a law that
unconstitutionally advanced religion under the Establishment Clause."
Although the Court upheld the law because it viewed the voucher
scheme as consistent with its Establishment Clause test,45 Justice
Thomas concurred and reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment could
not be employed to invalidate a neutral school choice program by
incorporating a structural component of the Establishment Clause. 46 As
he put it so well: "There would be a tragic irony in converting the
39 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). In other words, he views the
Establishment Clause as a structural limitation on the federal government and not as a
clause that protects individual rights and liberties. Id.
40 Id. at 51.
41 Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 310 (1963) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
42 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
43 See id. at 678-79. As Professor Esbeck has observed, "in order to make a power-
limiting clause suitable for absorption into the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court [in
Everson] had to strain in order to squeeze a structural clause into a 'liberty' mold." Esbeck,
supra note 33, at 27.
44 See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 647-49.
45 Id. at 653 (upholding the voucher program as a neutral scheme of "true private
choice").
46 Id. at 679-80 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas made clear that he can
and does accept incorporation of "religious liberty rights." Id. at 679.
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Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of individual liberty into a
prohibition on the exercise of educational choice."47 The incorporated
Establishment Clause does not give A a constitutional right to restrict
the liberty of B, nor to forbid the states from "giv[ing] parents a greater
choice as to where and in what manner to educate their children. ' 8
Similarly, Justice Thomas's concurring opinion in Newdow
concluded that voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance in the
public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause, because it does
not "implicate the possible liberty interest of being free from coercive
state establishments."49 In other words, state endorsement of the notion
that our Nation is "under God" does not violate the Establishment
Clause so long as "[t]he Pledge policy does not expose anyone to the legal
coercion associated with an established religion."50 According to Thomas,
the incorporated Establishment Clause does not impose a structural
limitation on the states stripping them of the power to sponsor, endorse,
or recognize a religious idea or symbol; rather, it protects the individual
liberty to be free from laws that substantially burden a person's right to
choose whether to participate in a religious ceremony or activity. A's
right under the Establishment Clause to refrain from participation in
the "under God" component of the Pledge ceremony-like B's right under
the Free Speech Clause to refrain from any compelled affirmation of
beliefSL-does not include the right to censor the curriculum nor to
silence his classmates who wish to pledge allegiance to "one Nation
under God."52
As with school choice and the Pledge, so also with public displays of
the Ten Commandments by state or local government. The incorporated
Establishment Clause "liberty" is not implicated so long as a person is
free to avert her eye. As Justice Thomas stated in Van Orden:
There is no question that, based on the original meaning of the
Establishment Clause, the Ten Commandments display at issue here
is constitutional. In no sense does Texas compel petitioner Van Orden
to do anything. The only injury to him is that he takes offense at
seeing the monument as he passes it on his way to the Texas Supreme
Court Library. He need not stop to read it or even to look at it, let
alone to express support for it or adopt the Commandments as guides
for his life. The mere presence of the monument along his path
47 Id. at 680.
48 Id.
49 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 53 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
50 Id. at 54.
51 See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-34 (1943).
52 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000); see supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text.
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involves no coercion and thus does not violate the Establishment
Clause.5 3
If Justice Thomas is guilty of anything concerning his views on
incorporation of the Establishment Clause, his sin is taking the Court's
theory of incorporation seriously. No one has a liberty to direct the
content of government speech merely because he is offended by the
message. Nor does liberty give one the right to silence others or to
restrict the liberties of others. The incorporated First Amendment is best
understood as protecting the equal liberty of all to choose whether to
participate in government programs and ceremonies that touch upon
religion. However, so long as the states do not restrict individual
religious liberty, they are not bound by the structural limitations of the
Establishment Clause that apply to Congress and the federal
government.
One common objection to the argument that the Establishment
Clause is a federalism provision and should thus be "disincorporated" 4 is
that the law applying the Establishment Clause to the states "is well
settled and nobody is particularly anxious to change it. ' ' 5  Indeed, even
most critics of the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence accept
incorporation as a "deed . . . now done"56 and recognize that "the sheer
force of time would seem to ensure that the Establishment Clause will
remain applicable against the states. '57 Justice Thomas's concept of
partial incorporation responds to this criticism by accepting
incorporation of the Establishment Clause while taking seriously the
doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates only individual
liberty interests, not structural provisions defining the powers of
53 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
54 See Vincent Phillip Mufioz, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause
and the Impossibility of Its Incorporation, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 585, 632 (2006) ("A
construction of the Establishment Clause strictly faithful to its original meaning would
require disincorporation and the overturning of nearly sixty years of 'no-establishment'
jurisprudence.").
55 Andrew Koppelman, Akhil Amar and the Establishment Clause, 33 U. RICH. L.
REV. 393, 404 (1999); see also Mufioz, supra note 54, at 633. Professor Koppelman's
assertion that "nobody" is inclined to change the Court's Establishment Clause decisions is
perhaps more a reflection of the social circles in which he moves than of reality. See infra
note 59 and accompanying text. I know many people who would like to change what they
perceive to be the anti-religious hostility of the Court's non-establishment jurisprudence.
Professors Jeffries and Ryan capture this reality when they note that the issue of prayer
and religion in schools reveals "a huge gap between the cultural elite and the rest of
America. People generally may have supported school prayer and Bible reading, but the
leadership class did not." John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the
Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 325 (2001).
56 See, e.g., KEVIN SEAMUs HASSON, THE RIGHT TO BE WRONG: ENDING THE
CULTURE WAR OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA 137 (2005).
57 Mufioz, supra note 54, at 633.
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Congress. This accepts what is settled-the incorporation of the
Establishment Clause-but requires the Court to carefully rethink each
case under the Establishment Clause to ensure that the Clause is
incorporated only to protect individual religious liberty from coercive
state establishments of religion.58 The Court's use of the Establishment
Clause to cleanse religion from public culture has never been widely
accepted by the American people,5 9 and partial incorporation asks only
that the Court treat liberty under the Establishment Clause the same
way it treats every other First Amendment liberty interest-as an
individual right protected against substantial burdens imposed by state
law, not as a license to dictate what ideas government may endorse or
recognize as part of the public culture of a pluralistic society.
III. PARTIAL INCORPORATION: RELIGIOUS LIBERTY WITHOUT
RELIGIOUS APARTHEID
If Justice Thomas succeeds in convincing a Supreme Court majority
to take the Court's own theory of incorporation seriously with respect to
the Establishment Clause, what will be the impact of separating
individual liberties from structural limitations under the Clause and
applying only the former against the states? It will take years for all the
58 See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 53 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). In other words, individual liberty under the incorporated Establishment
Clause is protected only against "actual legal coercion" imposed by state law. Id. at 52.
59 For example, a recent Fox News poll found that most Americans disagree with
many of the Supreme Court's modern Establishment Clause decisions:
The new poll finds that almost eight in 10 Americans (77 percent) believe
the courts have overreached in driving religion out of public life, and a 59
percent majority feels Christianity is under attack.
Majorities of Republicans (89 percent), Democrats (73 percent) and
independents (69 percent) think the courts have gone too far in taking religion
out of public life.
Overall, most Americans disagree with several Supreme Court rulings on
the separation of church and state. For example, an overwhelming 87 percent
favor allowing public schools to set aside time for a moment of silence, and 82
percent favor allowing voluntary prayer. Another 82 percent favor allowing
public schools to have a prayer at graduation ceremonies, and 83 percent think
nativity scenes should be allowed on public property.
Not only do three-quarters of Americans (76 percent) think posting the Ten
Commandments on government property should be legal, but also two-thirds
(66 percent) say it is a good idea to post the commandments in public schools.
Dana Blanton, 12/01/05 FOX Poll: Courts Driving Religion Out of Public Life; Christianity
Under Attack, Fox NEWS, Dec. 1, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,177355,00.
html. Fox News is not alone in this finding. A survey conducted by the First Amendment
Center found that "[n]early two-thirds of the public (65%) agree that 'teachers or other
public school officials should be allowed to lead prayers in school .... ... The First
Amendment in Public Schools: A Comprehensive Survey of How Administrators and
Teachers Vew the Rights and Responsibilities of the First Amendment, FREEDOM FORUM,
Mar. 1, 2001, http://www.freedomforum.orgttemplates/document.asp?documentID=13390.
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dust to settle, but two things are clear to me-critics will declare, "The
sky is falling"; and the critics will be wrong. Although the states would
have more room to experiment with laws touching upon religion,60 equal
religious liberty under the First Amendment would continue to be
incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Indeed, since the Establishment Clause would be incorporated only to
advance, but never to "constrain[] individual liberty,"61 religious liberty
should flourish because no one will have a right to employ the
Establishment Clause to dictate what others may say or view in the
public square and in the public schools. Moreover, partial incorporation
of the Establishment Clause strikes a reasonable "balance between the
demands of the Fourteenth Amendment on the one hand and the
federalism prerogatives of States on the other."62 So long as the states do
not impose substantial burdens on individual religious liberty, they are
free to recognize religion as a part of public culture and to experiment
with the curricula of public schools and the financing of educational
choice in ways that meet the needs of all their citizens, including
religious subgroups who wish to be included in the public square and
whose educational needs may be different from those in the majority. 63
Although the precise line between unincorporated structural
limitations on the federal government and incorporated individual
religious liberty interests will require development and refinement on a
case-by-case basis in the fullness of time, it is possible here to at least
begin to sketch an outline of partial incorporation. For example, the so-
called Lemon-Agostini test64-which prohibits laws that "have the
'purpose' or 'effect' of advancing . . . religion"65-imposes a structural
limitation on government by denying it the power to endorse religion, to
sponsor religion, or even to "express an opinion about religious
matters"66 or to "encourage citizens to hold certain religious beliefs."67 As
60 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 680 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
61 Id. at 678.
62 Id. at 679.
63 See id. at 676-84.
64 See id. at 648-49 (majority opinion) (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-
23 (1997)); see id. at 668 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 612-13 (1971)).
65 Id. at 648-49 (majority opinion) (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23) (stating that
the incorporated Establishment Clause "prevents a State from enacting laws that have the
'purpose' or 'effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion').
66 Andrew Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87, 109 (2002). Koppelman
describes this structural aspect of the Establishment Clause as "a restriction on
government speech." Id. See also Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal
Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266,
297 (1987) ('rhe principal kind of evil against which the [E]stablishment [C]lause protects
is institutional, not individual.").
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Justice Thomas points out, by incorporating these structural limitations
against the states the Court has "elevate[d] the trivial to the proverbial
'federal case,' by making benign signs and postings subject to
challenge"6 even though the liberty of no person is restricted by their
passive display on some public place. In other words, so long as no one is
required to participate, the interior decorating of public schools, public
courthouses, and the public square is a matter for each state and the
People of each state to decide.69
For example, County of Allegheny v. ACLU, in which a cr~che
display in a county courthouse was enjoined as an unconstitutional
endorsem~ent of religion by local government, 70 would almost certainly
come out the other way under Justice Thomas's view of partial
incorporation. The Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid states from
endorsing religion, but only from imposing religion in a way that
substantially burdens individual religious liberty.
Although Justice O'Connor has tried to explain the endorsement
test as a rule designed to protect an individual's right not to feel like an
outsider or a disfavored member of the political community, 71 this view
amounts to nothing more than an unconvincing attempt to portray a
structural limitation on state government speech as a spurious right to
censor public displays that one finds offensive. Why should we think that
liberty under the Establishment Clause includes the right to control
which holidays state governments may celebrate and which ideas state
governments may express? This is an extraordinary "liberty," unlike any
other liberty incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment.
For example, no one would argue that the Free Exercise Clause
protects a person's right to censor public displays that offend his
sincerely held religious beliefs. Thus, A does not have a First
Amendment right to enjoin a "gay pride" display in a public park because
67 Koppelman, supra note 66. Koppelman admits that his view is not concerned
with protecting the liberty of "aggrieved" individuals, but rather with limiting the
institutional powers of state and local governments. Id. at 112.
68 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring).
69 As Judge McConnell has argued, "Not what flunks the [Lemon-Agostini] test, but
what interferes with religious liberty, is an establishment of religion." Michael W.
McConnell, Coercion: The Lost Element of Establishment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 933, 941
(1986); see also Meier, supra note 27, at 174-75 (observing that most Establishment Clause
cases are not about protecting individual liberty, but rather are about a plaintiff who
wishes to "restrain government from doing something with which the individual
disagrees").
70 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989).
71 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating
that government action endorsing religion is invalid "because it 'sends a message to
nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community"')
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)); see also Koppelman, supra note 66,
at 112.
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it offends his religious beliefs and sends a message to him that he is an
outsider and a disfavored member of the political community. A's remedy
is to avoid the offensive display or to avert his eye when walking past
it.72 Similarly, B should not have a First Amendment right to enjoin a
Christmas display that she finds offensive. The incorporated
Establishment Clause protects individual liberty from substantial
burdens imposed by state action, but there is no liberty to not be
offended by government speech in the public square. Indeed, a rule
cleansing religious displays from the public square actually promotes the
evil it seeks to avoid, because by singling out religious displays for
exclusion from the public culture the Court is sending a message that
people of faith are outsiders, disfavored members of the political
community whose holidays and ideas may not be recognized and
celebrated in a public square that includes everyone else.73 As Steven
Smith argues, if religious symbols and holidays are cleansed from the
public square, many religious citizens may "feel that their most central
values and concerns-and thus, in an important sense, they
themselves-have been excluded from a public culture devoted purely to
secular concerns." 74
In order to succeed in an Establishment Clause case brought
against state or local government, the claimant should be required to
demonstrate that the challenged law or policy substantially burdens an
individual liberty protected under the Clause. 75 The kind of "psychic
harm" one experiences when government endorses a controversial idea
or symbol in the public schools or upon the public square76 does not
impose a substantial burden on an incorporated Establishment Clause
liberty, unless a dissenter is compelled to affirm his belief in the
offensive idea. If A has no right to forbid the teaching of evolution in the
public schools because that lesson is offensive to his religious beliefs
72 See William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free
Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 358-59 (1990-1991) ("Outside the establishment
area, the state's use of controversial symbols does not give rise to constitutional concern no
matter how offensive those symbols might be.").
73 See Smith, supra note 66, at 278 ("I]n a polity in which government regularly
acknowledges and accommodates citizen interests of various sorts, deliberate indifference
toward one class of interests may easily shade into . . . disapproval-which Justice
O'Connor's [endorsement] test would also forbid.").
74 Id. at 3 10-11.
75 The individual liberty protected by the Establishment Clause is perhaps best
understood as a right of "religious choice," and then the "establishment clause analysis
would lead to a proscription of all government action that has the purpose and effect of
coercing or altering religious belief or action." McConnell, supra note 69, at 940.
76 See Marshall, supra note 72, at 357 (referring to the endorsement test as
"protecting people from psychic harm" or "from symbolic alienation").
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protected under the Free Exercise Clause, 77 then B has no right to forbid
the teaching of intelligent design in the public schools because that
lesson is offensive to his liberty protected under the Establishment
Clause. Since the structural component of the Establishment Clause
limiting the power of the states to endorse or advance religion is not
subject to incorporation, the merits and wisdom of education in the
public schools are for school boards and state legislators-not federal
judges-to determine, so long as individual liberty under the First
Amendment is not substantially burdened.
If we return our attention to the three hypothetical lawsuits
regarding the Pledge of Allegiance posed previously in this Article, 78 we
will see that they should all come out the same way whether decided
under the incorporated Free Speech, Free Exercise, or Establishment
Clauses. In each case, individual liberty will be protected from compelled
affirmation of belief, but in none of the cases will A, B, or C have a right
to censor the curriculum or to silence classmates who wish to Pledge
their allegiance to "one Nation under God. ' '79 This approach to
incorporation of the First Amendment recognizes the important principle
of uniformity of all the liberties protected by the First Amendment.
Individual liberty under the Establishment Clause is neither more
important-nor more fragile-than the liberties of belief, expression, and
religious exercise protected under the Free Speech and Free Exercise
Clauses. Moreover, as Justice Thomas has argued, partial incorporation
of the Establishment Clause leaves to the People and the democratic
process in the states the ability to enact laws and policies that best
promote the interests and needs of all persons,8 0 including persons
belonging to religious subgroups who often feel like second class citizens
in the public schools and public squares of their communities.81 In other
words, under Justice Thomas's approach to incorporation of the
Establishment Clause, the equal liberty of all is protected without the
77 See id. at 375 (concluding that "offense is not cognizable as a component of a free
exercise claim'). Marshall argues, however, that under the Establishment Clause,
"[g]overnmental actions that improperly endorse religion are unconstitutional per se." Id.
at 374. Marshall's position recognizes the Establishment Clause as imposing a structural
limitation on the states, but he does not explain how this structural limitation is subject to
incorporation as a Fourteenth Amendment "liberty."
78 See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
79 4 U.S.C. § 4 (2000).
80 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 679 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(referring to the need to balance liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment with "the
federalism prerogatives of [the] States").
81 See Smith, supra note 66, at 310-11 (noting that there is "powerful evidence"
that many religious people feel alienated from what they perceive to be the "antireligious"
nature of public schools and certain other "areas of public life").
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kind of judicially-imposed religious apartheid that forbids states from
respecting the needs and traditions of religious citizens and subgroups8 2
The most difficult issue under the jurisprudence of partial
incorporation is that of prayer in the public schools. Since structural
limitations on religious endorsement and sponsorship are not
incorporated against the states, school prayer should be unconstitutional
only to the extent that it restricts individual liberty under the
Establishment Clause.
Lee v. Weisman 3 is an illustrative case. In Weisman, a public
middle school invited Rabbi Leslie Gutterman to deliver an inclusive and
nonsectarian "Invocation" and "Benediction" at its graduation
ceremony.8 4 Although attendance at graduation was not required,
undoubtedly the ceremony was a "significant occasionf" in the academic
careers of all students, including those who were offended by any kind of
school-sponsored prayer.8 5
Under both partial incorporation and the Court's opinion in
Weisman, it is undisputed that liberty under the Establishment Clause
"guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise."8 6 Thus, it is clear that government
may not compel students to participate in school prayer or to affirm their
belief in the content of the prayer. Up to this point, both Weisman and
partial incorporation are in accord in protecting liberty under the
Establishment Clause. However, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in
Weisman goes a step further and imposes a structural limitation on
government participation in "religious debate or expression '87 that
forbids the state from sponsoring a religious message "in a school
setting."88 Thus, even if the school makes clear that participation in a
school-sponsored prayer is voluntary, the Establishment Clause protects
"freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary
and secondary public schools." 9 Although this sounds as though the
Court is concerned about protecting individual liberty from even subtle
indoctrination in the public schools, Justice Kennedy made clear that
students may be compelled "to attend classes and assemblies and to
complete assignments exposing them to ideas they find distasteful or
82 See id.
83 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
84 Id. at 580-82.
85 Id. at 595-96 ("Attendance may not be required by official decree, yet it is
apparent that a student is not free to absent herself from the graduation exercise ...
[without forfeiting the] intangible benefits" of taking part in the ceremony.).
86 Id. at 587.
87 Id. at 591.
88 Id. at 594.
89 Id. at 592.
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immoral or absurd" or "offensive and irreligious."90 For all its talk about
protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure, when its
rhetorical veil is pierced Weisman is not really concerned with protecting
individual liberty, but rather with enforcing a structural limitation
prohibiting state-sponsored religious expression.91  Under the
jurisprudence of partial incorporation, Weisman should come out the
other way; so long as no one is compelled to participate, a
commencement prayer at a public school does not impose a substantial
burden on individual liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment. Some
students may find religious expression at graduation offensive, just as
some students may find certain secular ideas expressed at graduation
offensive. However, so long as no student is compelled to affirm his or
her belief in any idea, individual liberty under the incorporated First
Amendment does not give any student the right to censor the program or
to dictate which messages other students may hear. As Justice Kennedy
put it so well (before choosing to ignore it): "To endure the speech of false
ideas or offensive content and then to counter it is part of learning how
to live in a pluralistic society, a society which insists upon open discourse
towards the end of a tolerant citizenry. And tolerance presupposes some
mutuality of obligation." 92
If religious students must endure a great deal of secular speech that
offends their religious sensibilities, it does not seem too much to ask
other students to endure a brief invocation to God notwithstanding their
preference for a strictly-secular public culture. Both religious and
secular students should be welcome in the public schools, but no student
has a right to silence others or to demand that any idea be cleansed from
school programs. We are not a strictly-secular people, and a strictly-
secular public culture is a poor reflection of the diversity of our
pluralistic Nation.
CONCLUSION
It is a clich6 to observe that the Supreme Court's Establishment
Clause jurisprudence is in a hopeless state of disarray.9 3 This confusion
90 Id. at 591.
91 See id. (stating that "the Establishment Clause is a specific prohibition on forms
of state intervention in religious affairs with no precise counterpart in the speech
provisions").
92 Id. at 590-91.
93 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(stating that "this Court's [Establishment Clause] jurisprudence leaves courts,
governments, and believers and nonbelievers alike confused-an observation that is hardly
new"); Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115,
117-20 (1992) (noting "inconsistencies," "contradiction," and "chaos" amid the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, and concluding that: "It is a mess').
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in the law no doubt results-at least in part-from the Court's decision
to incorporate the Establishment Clause as a structural limitation on the
power of the states to endorse or advance religion, thereby transforming
a clause designed to promote federalism, by insulating state autonomy
over religion from federal interference, into a provision that empowers
federal courts to sit in judgment over the curricula of public schools and
the decoration of public parks and buildings.
Although Justice Clarence Thomas believes "that the Establishment
Clause is a federalism provision, which, for this reason, resists
incorporation,"94 he has also expressed a view that allows the
Establishment Clause to be incorporated to the extent that it protects an
individual liberty against substantial burdens imposed by state action.
Under this theory of partial incorporation, the states are free to
recognize and celebrate the role of religion in the history and culture of
America, so long as they do not compel individuals to affirm any
religious belief or to participate in any religious exercise. Justice
Thomas's theory of partial incorporation does not ask the Court to reject
the doctrine of incorporation by "disincorporating" the Establishment
Clause. Instead it challenges the Court to take its own theory seriously
by incorporating the Establishment Clause only to the extent that it
advances individual religious liberty.
Under the jurisprudence of partial incorporation, the states should
not be bound by structural limitations of the Establishment Clause that
apply to Congress and the federal government. So long as the states do
not impose coercive burdens on individual religious liberty, they are free
to recognize religion as part of public culture and to experiment with the
curricula of public schools and the financing of educational choice in
ways that meet the needs of all their citizens, including members of
religious subgroups who wish to be included in the public square and
whose educational needs may be different from those in the majority.
The precise line between unincorporated structural limitations and
incorporated individual liberty interests will take time to develop in the
caselaw; however, decisions imposing structural limitations on the power
of the states to endorse or advance religion, or to express an opinion
about religion, should not survive re-examination under the theory of
partial incorporation.
Of course, state constitutions may impose structural limitations on
state and local government concerning endorsement of religion in public
schools and public displays. Indeed, as Joseph Snee has stated, the
religious freedom of American citizens is perhaps "safer in the hands" of
94 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45-46 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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state legislatures and state courts, than in the hands of the federal
judiciary. 95
Although many commentators will undoubtedly flap their wings and
cry "the sky is falling," lovers of liberty need not fear. Equal religious
liberty will be secure-and indeed will flourish-under partial
incorporation. Our Nation is not a strictly-secular one, and our public
culture may and should reflect the rich, religious diversity of our people.
No one should be compelled to affirm any belief or participate in any
religious practice, but no one has the right to silence others, to control
which lessons public schools may teach and willing pupils may learn, or
to censor the public culture. As Justice Thomas has put it so well,
"[wihen rights are incorporated against the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment they should advance, not constrain, individual
liberty."96 Equal liberty under the First Amendment is not equal when
the Establishment Clause is interpreted to require a strict cleansing of
religion from the public culture. Under Justice Thomas's approach to
incorporation of the Establishment Clause, the religious liberty of all is
respected without the kind of judicially-imposed religious apartheid that
forbids the states from respecting the needs and traditions of religious
citizens and subgroups. In other words, by taking the theory of
incorporation seriously, Justice Thomas's jurisprudence of partial
incorporation results in a triumph for pluralism and equal liberty under
the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
95 Snee, supra note 2, at 407.
96 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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